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DAMAGES FOR PARTIAL PRODUCT DESIGN PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT 
Patryk Oskar Rogowski* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article I of the United States Constitution provides, “Con-
gress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1  
The power of the patent holder is extraordinarily strong as it grants 
the patent holder a monopoly over the invention.2  As the Supreme 
Court noted, “The franchise which the patent grants, consists alto-
gether in the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or vend-
ing the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.”3 
In the 2016 term, the Supreme Court of the United States was 
faced with the issue of determining the appropriate damages for in-
fringement of design patents when the infringed design constituted 
only a small piece of the end-product.4  In Apple, Inc. v. Samsung El-
ecs. Co,5 the jury in the District Court found that Samsung infringed 
 
* B.A. in Political Science and Economics, Stony Brook University 2014; J.D. Candidate 
2018, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  I would like to give special thanks to 
Professor Rena Seplowitz for her patience, support, and encouragement throughout the entire 
writing process and law school.  I would like to thank the members of the Touro Law Re-
view, especially my Notes Editor Rhona Amorado.  Lastly, I would like to express the deep-
est thanks to my family and friends who have provided enormous support and motivation 
throughout my law school career. 
1 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 2. 
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M. B. H., 426 
F. Supp 143, 146 (D.D.C. 1976). 
3 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852). 
4 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
5 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
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three design patents owned by Apple.6  The jury awarded Apple the 
total amount of profits that Samsung earned in selling the smartphone 
device at issue.7  To be precise, the full amount of profits included 
profits derived from components of Samsung’s devices, which were 
designed exclusively by Samsung and had no connection to Apple in 
any way.8 
The Federal Circuit upheld the District Court’s verdict and 
award.9  The Federal Circuit interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 28910 to mean 
that the infringing “article of manufacture” in a multicomponent de-
vice refers to the end-product.11  This narrow reading of the statute 
underlay Samsung’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.12 
In its petition, Samsung argued that the Court should apply an 
apportionment test, which would result in damages that are propor-
tional to the infringed patents in the final article of manufacture.13  
Apple, on the other hand, argued that the Supreme Court should up-
hold the entire-profit test applied by both the District Court and the 
Federal Circuit.14 
On December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court held that the Fed-
eral Circuit interpreted Section 289 too narrowly, and that lower 
courts can interpret the term article of manufacture to mean either a 
final product as a whole or one component of the final product.15  The 
Court, in a brief and limited opinion, reversed the decision and re-
manded it to the Federal Circuit.16  In turn, the Federal Circuit re-
 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’g in part, rev’g in 
part 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2013), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
10 See infra text accompanying note 57. 
11 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001. 
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Writ of 
Certiorari]. 
13 Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Brief for 
Petitioner].  A court applying the apportionment test would first find the ratio of the total 
components of the multicomponent device and the infringing components. Id.  The court 
would then apply damages proportionally to that ratio. Id.  If three components in the device 
were infringing, but the entire device was made up of 100 components, the infringed party 
would be entitled to three percent of the total profits. Id.  Thus, Samsung would only pay for 
what it infringed. Id. 
14 Brief for Respondent at 4, Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (No. 15-777) [hereinafter Brief for Re-
spondent].  Under this argument, Samsung would forfeit profits for components of the de-
vice, which Apple had no part in creating. Id. 
15 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 431. 
16 Id. 
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manded the case to the District Court with explicit permission to 
formulate a new test in dealing with infringements of multicompo-
nent devices.17 
Broadening a definition of a term or phrase in patent law may 
lead to an increase in litigation.18  In Apple, the Supreme Court gave 
lower courts the opportunity to broaden the meaning of article of 
manufacture.19  Broadening of the statutory language is likely to cre-
ate confusion among lower courts as to how exactly to apply the stat-
ute.20  Further, the Federal Circuit, in remanding the case to the Dis-
trict Court, did not provide guidance as to what test should be applied 
in multicomponent device infringement cases, such as Apple.  Leav-
ing the task to lower courts could add to the complexity of interpret-
ing and applying Section 289. In determining what test the courts 
should ultimately adopt, it is important to analyze the purpose of de-
sign patents, the statutory language governing design patent awards, 
and economic implications that will result from the application and 
enforcement of each test. 
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court erred by stating a 
broader interpretation of Section 289 may be appropriate without 
providing clear guidelines as to how courts should apply this broader 
interpretation.  This Note will propose four tests that the judicial 
branch could apply to provide predictability to litigants and direction 
to courts.21 
This Note will be divided into twelve sections.  Section II will 
discuss design patents, including the key differences between a de-
sign patent and a utility patent.  Section III will examine the Patent 
Act of 1952, and introduce Section 289, which is at the heart of this 
Note.  Section IV will provide the procedural history of the Apple lit-
igation.  Section V will analyze the arguments presented by both par-
ties at the Supreme Court.  Section VI will discuss the important 
2016 Supreme Court decision in Apple, in which the Court found it-
self with the task of defining the phrase article of manufacture in Sec-
tion 289.  Section VII will examine the history of apportionment, the 
 
17 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed. Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2017). 
18 Lucas S. Osborn, Ripple Effects in the Law: The Broadening Meaning of an “Offer to 
Sell” in Patent Law, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 546, 556 (2014). 
19 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 431. 
20 Id. The confusion stems primarily from a lack of guidance as to when the term should 
apply to the final product and when it should apply solely to the infringing component. Id. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 233-302. 
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leading method courts utilized in dealing with similar damages is-
sues.  Section VIII will discuss the importance of rewards for innova-
tors.  Section IX will present the judicial approaches to damages in 
utility patent cases.  Section X will propose four tests that the judici-
ary could adopt for design patent infringement cases in which only 
one or a few components in a multicomponent product are infringed.  
This section will analyze how each proposed approach would apply 
to Apple if a court were to adopt the applicable test.  Section XI will 
focus on proposed legislative solutions to clarify Section 289 and 
provide predictability to future litigants and guidance to the courts.  
Finally, Section XII will conclude that a consumer demand approach 
is the best approach for the Supreme Court to ultimately adopt. 
II. PATENTS IN GENERAL 
There are two main types of patents––design patents and utili-
ty patents.22  Courts treat them separately when it comes to awarding 
damages, and thus, it is critical that inventors determine what type of 
patent applies to their product because each type protects a product 
differently, which ultimately affects how damages are calculated.23 
Despite the differences between design and utility patents, 
courts sometimes treat design patents and utility patents similarly.24  
In certain jurisdictions, “courts have . . . required some degree of ‘pa-
tentable distinction’ or ‘inventive faculty’ similar to the obviousness 
requirement for utility patents.”25  However, in general, the courts, 
especially in the realm of awarding damages, treat design and utility 
patents differently. 
A. Design Patents 
A design patent is defined, generally, as “a patent granted for 
 
22 Additionally, there are plant patents, but they are outside the scope of this Note. See 35 
U.S.C. § 161 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct 
and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found 
seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
23 Utility vs. Design, NEUSTEL, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 
https://www.neustel.com/patents/utility-vs-design/ (last visited March 13, 2017). 
24 Bruce A. Kugler, A Fresh Perspective on Design Patents, 38 COLO. LAW. 71, 73 
(2009). 
25 Id.; see In re Bartlett, 300 F.2d 942 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also Fields v. Schuyler, 472 
F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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a new, original, and ornamental design26 for an article of manufac-
ture.”27  Notably, a design patent does not protect utilitarian features 
of the product, which are “afford[ed a] legally separate protection.”28  
A design patent does not protect functional aspects of an article of 
manufacture but rather its appearance and visual features.29  Design 
patents require the design to be “new, original, and ornamental.”30  
Design patents, like the ones at issue in Apple, provide protections for 
inventions including an animated graphical user interface,31 ornamen-
tal design of a keyboard,32 or application icon.33 
A design patent is of great importance to an innovator.34  De-
sign patents provide the inventor with a monopoly over the design for 
fifteen years from the date of issue.35  As evidenced by Apple, a de-
sign patent is so valuable in its nature that its infringement warrants 
aggressive litigation between two of the world’s largest smartphone 
device manufacturers.36 
B. Utility Patents 
While a design patent protects the aesthetic and visual fea-
tures of an article,37 a utility patent protects how the product works 
and functions.38 Utility patents originally protected primarily 
mechanical and electrical devices.39  However, today, utility patents 
 
26 In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An ornamental design has “no use 
other than its visual appearance.”). 
27 Design Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
28 A Guide to Filing a Design Patent Application, UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/iip/pdf/brochure_05.pdf. (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2017).  Utilitarian features are features which are functional and serve some 
purpose of use, as opposed to decorative or ornamental use. Id. 
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
30 RONALD B. HILDRETH, ET AL., PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 1:7.2 (4th ed. 
2016). 
31 U.S. Patent No. D613,300 (issued Apr. 6, 2010). 
32 U.S. Patent No. D616,886 (issued June 1, 2010). 
33 U.S. Patent No. D671,558 (issued Nov. 27, 2012). 
34 See generally William J. Seymour & Andrew W. Torrance, (R)evolution in Design Pa-
tentable Subject Matter: The Shifting Meaning of “Article of Manufacture”, 17 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 183 (2013). 
35 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012).  The term for a design patent was extended to 15 years from 
the date of grant for applications filed on or after May 13, 2015. 
36 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
37 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
38 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
39 J. David Gonce, My Client Has This Great Idea. Now, What am I Supposed to Do With 
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protect a wider array of subject matter such as computer programs,40 
methods of doing business,41 and genetically modified living organ-
isms.42 
A utility patent gives the inventor a monopoly to manufacture, 
use, and sell the patented device for twenty years from the filing 
date.43  Utility patents cover parts of the smartphone such as list 
scrolling,44 application programming interfaces for scrolling opera-
tions,45 or graphical user interface for displaying structured electronic 
documents.46  Those three utility patents were part of the Apple litiga-
tion at the District Court, and the Federal Circuit upheld their in-
fringement.47 
III. THE PATENT ACT OF 1952 
The Patent Act of 1952 was a congressional initiative to codi-
fy federal patent laws.48  The Act established Title 35 of the United 
States Code.49  One of the Act’s purposes was to provide protections 
for the patent holder.50  While there is no physical barrier preventing 
any individual from explicitly infringing on a patent, patent holders 
have the option to pursue a financial or equitable remedy when they 
believe that their patent was infringed.51  Sometimes, the award of an 
injunction against the infringer is not enough and the court also 
awards damages.52  If the patent holder obtains an injunction against 
the infringer, there is a high likelihood that the infringer has pro-
 
It? Protecting Your Client’s Intellectual Property, 42 TENN. BAR J. 14, 15 (2006). 
40 See generally Dealtracker, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing a 
patent for a program which aided the processing of credit card applications over electronic 
networks). 
41 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (discussing a patent for 
the method of conducting on-line sales). 
42 See generally Dealtracker, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1315; see generally Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that “a live, human-made micro-organism is pa-
tentable subject matter under [35 U.S.C.] § 101”). 
43 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
44 U.S. Patent No. 7,469,381 (Issued Dec. 23, 2008). 
45 U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (Issued Nov. 30, 2010). 
46 U.S. Patent No. 7,864,163 (Issued Jan. 4, 2011). 
47 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
48 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:23 (4th ed. 2016). 
49 Id. 
50 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
51 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
52 Id. (specific statutory language permitting financial damages for infringement). 
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duced, manufactured, and sold the product containing an infringing 
article of manufacture.53  A patent holder is unlikely to be aware of 
the infringement at the early stages of the infringer’s manufacturing 
process and before sales have begun to occur.54 
The core question behind any patent litigation is: What ap-
propriate amount of damages is the plaintiff patent-holder entitled to 
recover from the defendant patent-infringer?55  In determining the 
appropriate amount of damages in design patent cases, the courts 
look to 35 U.S.C. § 289 for answers.56  The statute provides: 
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, 
without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented 
design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any 
article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) 
sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to 
which such design or colorable imitation has been 
applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his 
total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any 
United States district court having jurisdiction of the 
parties.57 
The natural reading of this section suggests that if a design patent is 
infringed, the plaintiff can recover all profits derived from the in-
fringer’s sale of the product.58 
Apple presented the Supreme Court with a complex scenario, 
which has recently caused great confusion in the Federal Circuit.59  In 
granting certiorari, the Court was tasked to answer “[W]here a design 
patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award 
of infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the 
 
53 See Apple, 786 F.3d at 983 (stating that Samsung was selling the smartphone containing 
infringing patents). 
54 See Tiffany & Co. v. Costco Wholesaler Corporation, 127 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing that plaintiff learned about infringement when a customer re-
ported seeing similar product at defendant’s place of business); Herbert J. Hammond et al., 
Intellectual Property Issues in E-Commerce, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV 743, 744 (2014) 
(explaining that United States patent law also includes a “mere offer to sell” an infringing 
product). 
55 Matthew C. Holohan, Making Sense of Apportionment in Patent Damages: Strategy in 
the Face of Uncertainty, 44 COLO. LAW. 81, 81 (2015) (calling damages an “important as-
pect of litigation”). 
56 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001. 
57 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006) (emphasis added). 
58 Id. 
59 See Apple, 786 F.3d. at 983. 
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component?”60  On December 6, 2016, the Court, in a brief ruling, 
held that the term article of manufacture in Section 289 is “broad 
enough to embrace both a product sold to a consumer and a compo-
nent of that product.”61 
IV. APPLE V. SAMSUNG: PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The litigation arose out of the three design patents owned by 
Apple, which cover various features of smartphones.62  All three pa-
tents are narrow, protecting very specific parts of the product, and 
“claim only partial features of a smartphone’s design.”63  The first 
design patent, D618,677, covers a black rectangular round-cornered 
front face.64  The second design patent, D593,087, covers a “substan-
tially similar rectangular round-cornered front face plus the surround-
ing rim or ‘bezel’. . . .” 65  The third design patent, D604,305, covers 
“a particular colorful grid of sixteen icons.”66 Apple sued Samsung 
for the infringement of these design patents.67 
The litigation at the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California resulted in a jury verdict in favor of 
Apple.68  After the victory, Apple filed a motion for supplemental 
damages and prejudgment interest.69 
Samsung appealed to the Federal Circuit on two different 
counts.70  First, Samsung argued the District Court erred by failing to 
 
60 Question Presented, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). In 1998, 
the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he statute requires the disgorgement of the infringers' profits 
to the patent holder, such that the infringers retain no profit from their wrong.” Nike Inc. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  In 2009, the Federal Circuit 
overturned a $357,693,056.18 verdict against Microsoft for its infringement of a date-picker 
feature in its Outlook software. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 30 S. Ct. 3324 (2010).  The court held that “the infringing use of 
Outlook's date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and that 
the portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker tool is 
exceedingly small.” Id. at 1333. 
61 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 435. 
62 Apple, 2012 WL 3071477 at *1. 
63 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6. 
64 See Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6. 
65 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 6. 
66 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 55. 
67 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
68 Apple, 2012 WL 3071477. 
69 Apple, 786 F.3d at 983. 
70 Id. 
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properly instruct the jury to focus solely on the ornamental compo-
nents of the product.71  The Federal Circuit held that the District 
Court did not err when it failed to instruct the jury on a proper meth-
od to determine the infringement of design patents.72  Rather, it per-
mitted the jury to compare the two products side-by-side and decide 
whether similarities existed.73  That analysis, Samsung alleged, was 
unfairly prejudicial and too broad to establish infringement on three 
design patents.74 
Second, Samsung argued that the District Court erred in 
regard to the amount of damages awarded to Apple.75  The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to award Apple the en-
tire amount of profits from Samsung’s sale of smartphones, which 
contained the patented designs worth $399 million.76  The court re-
lied on Section 289 to determine that the “total amount of profits” 
was appropriate.77  This ruling required the court to determine the 
meaning of the term article of manufacture, the question ultimately 
presented to the Supreme Court. 
When interpreting what an article of manufacture is in a mul-
ticomponent product, the Federal Circuit held that the entire 
smartphone device is the only allowable article of manufacture.78  
The Federal Circuit, in its interpretation of Section 289, held that if a 
product bears a design, which is protected by an existing patent, the 
infringer is liable for the entire amount of the profits derived from the 
product, “no matter how minor the patented design in relation to the 
product as a whole.”79  The Federal Circuit did not engage in any 
complex interpretation of Section 289.80  Rather, the court held that 
 
71 Id. 
72 Samsung, on the other hand, argued that the District Court should have instructed the 
jury that “each of these patents contains indisputably unprotected elements within its overall 
claimed ‘ornamental’ design.” See Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.  Similarly, the Federal 
Circuit issued a simple interpretation in Nike, when it held that “The statute requires the dis-
gorgement of the infringers' profits to the patent holder, such that the infringers retain no 
profit from their wrong.” Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
73 Apple, 678 F.3d at 1330. 
74 Id at 1332. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Apple, 786 F.3d at 983. 
79 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24. 
80 See generally Apple, 786 F.3d 983. 
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there is “clear statutory language,” which “prohibits [the court] from 
adopting a ‘causation’ rule.”81  The Federal Circuit affirmed the Dis-
trict Court’s narrow reading of Section 289 of the Patent Act.82  Sam-
sung subsequently filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, arguing that the Federal Circuit erred by reading 
Section 289 too narrowly.83 
V. ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
After losing in both the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, Samsung filed a writ for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court.84  The core arguments revolved around 
the proper interpretation of the ambiguously worded Section 289 of 
the Patent Act.85  If the statute were to be read narrowly, as held by 
the District Court and upheld by the Federal Circuit, then Apple 
would prevail because the article of manufacture would encompass 
the entire multicomponent device––the finished product.86  If the 
statute were to be read more broadly, Samsung would prevail.87  A 
broader reading would mean that the article of manufacture could be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, and Samsung, on remand, would be 
able to make an argument that the appropriate damages are those of 
the specific infringing components, not the device as a whole.88 
Samsung argued the holding of the lower court “provide[s] a 
vehicle for design-patent holders to obtain unjustified windfalls far 
exceeding the conceivable value of any inventive contribution.”89  
Specifically, Samsung pointed out the lower court’s observation that 
“even if the patent features contributed 1% of the value of Samsung’s 
phones, Apple gets 100% of Samsung’s profits.”90  Consequently, 
Samsung warned that this decision is “an open invitation to litigation 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. 
84 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. 
85 See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13; see generally Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 14. 
86 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435 (2016); Brief for Petitioner, su-
pra note 13. 
87 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14. 
88 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436. 
89 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. 
90 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. 
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abuse” which may bring a “new flood of extortionate patent litiga-
tion.”91 
By Apple’s own admission, the narrow patents, which were 
infringed, are not components that drive sales.92  Rather, Apple stated 
that the “software creates the largest share of [the] product’s value.”93  
The functionality of the smartphone itself, including the software and 
the smartphone’s other capabilities, is the main selling point of the 
device.94  Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in an 8-0 opinion, authored 
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor,95 interpreted the statute more broadly, to 
cover both the finished product and individual components.96 
A. Arguments of the Appellant, Samsung 
Samsung had a lot to lose at the Supreme Court.97  Not only 
was Samsung fighting to overturn the judgment of the lower court but 
it also knew this case was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
settle the issue of appropriate damages for infringement of a multi-
component product, after previously denying certiorari on this issue 
many times.98 
The Supreme Court heard arguments on October 11, 2016, 
and focused a significant amount of time on the article of manufac-
ture question.99  Kathleen M. Sullivan, appearing on behalf of Sam-
sung, argued strongly that the Federal Circuit’s holding “was wrong 
as a matter of law.”100  She stated, “It is wrong . . . to hold that the en-
tire product is necessarily the article of manufacture from which you 
measure total profit.”101  Answering Justice Ginsburg’s question, 
“how would [the Court] determine the profit attributable to the rele-
 
91 Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12. 
92 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9. 
93 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9. 
94 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13 at 9. 
95 Following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016, the Supreme Court 
sat with only eight justices. 
96 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
97 Judgment of the lower court awarded nearly $1 billion in damages. See Apple, 2012 WL 
3071477. 
98 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
99 Oral Argument, Samsung v. Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (No. 15-777), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-777 (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Oral Ar-
gument]. 
100 Id. at 6:35. 
101 Id. at 6:40. 
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vant article of manufacture?,” Ms. Sullivan responded that the proper 
method would be “through ordinary accounting that would look to 
the cost of goods sold in relation to revenues for the relevant compo-
nent.”102  To determine the cost of goods sold, Ms. Sullivan suggest-
ed the trial court should rely on the testimony of expert witnesses.103  
Although conceding that the “total profit from the article of manufac-
ture may sometimes be a substantial part of the total profit on the 
product,” Ms. Sullivan argued that the burden of proof would be on 
the patent-holder to “prove that the bulk of the profits came from [the 
given article of manufacture].”104 
1. Purchaser Motivation and Apportionment 
In its brief, Samsung argued “consumers purchased           
Samsung . . . phones overwhelmingly because of their functional, 
non-design features.”105  Relying on Apple’s market research, Sam-
sung argued that other factors drove the sales, which outweighed the 
infringing design patents at bar.106  The value consumers placed on 
various functional aspects of the phone (e.g., screen size, company 
reputation, and the app market) outweighed the value consumers 
placed on the design features of the smartphones in question.107  In 
fact, “according to . . . Apple market data, a phone’s ‘design’ in gen-
eral was a reason for only 1% of Apple’s purchases and 5% of An-
droid purchases, far below other considerations such as services, mul-
timedia functions, ease of use, and brand.”108 
Furthermore, Samsung pointed out that Section 289 “limits 
recoverable total profit to that attributable to the article of manufac-
 
102 Id. at 7:34. 
103 Id. at 8:29. 
104 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 9:45.  Much of the oral argument focused on the 
Volkswagen Beetle car. Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 9:45. Primarily, there were ques-
tions whether the VW Beetle’s peculiar shape drove the sales. Justice Kennedy, questioning 
Ms. Sullivan, raised the issue that it would be unfair if the Volkswagen Beetle design was 
“done in three days” and “was a stroke of genius,” to “give three days’ profit.” Oral Argu-
ment, supra note 99, at 9:45. 
105 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
106 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9. 
107 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9. 
108 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10.  If the Supreme Court were to formulate a 
test that apportioned the damages for the infringement of a design patent, which composed a 
small percentage of the smartphone, it seems reasonable that the value placed by the pur-
chasing consumer on given design and functional parts would have to be taken into consid-
eration. 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/22
2017 DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT 1255 
ture to which an infringing design is ‘applied.’”109  Samsung argued 
that the article of manufacture does not necessarily have to “be the 
entire product as sold.”110  Rather, the article of manufacture can be a 
small component of a finished product, meaning the “finished prod-
uct can be made from numerous articles of manufacture.”111 
Realizing that the apportionment argument has flaws, as it 
would be very difficult for courts to administer, Samsung argued that: 
Consumers may value the front face because it’s 
scratch-resistant, because it’s water-resistant, because 
it’s shatterproof.  We’re going to give the patent-
holder under our article-of-manufacture test all the 
profits for the front face, even if it includes profit from 
those non-design features of the front face, whether 
the pure apportionment test or pure causation test 
would limit the profits to the profits from the design 
parts rather than the functional parts.112 
Conceding that this proposed test would be “a little over inclusive,” 
Samsung claimed “plaintiffs should be happy for that.”113 
2.   Analysis of Samsung’s Apportionment and 
Purchaser Motivation Argument 
Each individual purchasing a smartphone values different 
parts of a smartphone differently.114  Person A might put great value 
on a smartphone’s GPS capabilities and the size of the app store, and 
put little value on the smartphone’s rectangular round-cornered de-
sign.115  On the other hand, Person B might, as Steve Jobs did, find 
the aesthetic appearance and design of the smartphone to be of enor-
mous value, particularly if that purchaser uses the smartphone solely 
 
109 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24. 
110 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25. 
111 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25.  This argument, accepted by the Court, likely 
limits Apple’s recovery to only the profits Samsung derived from the three articles of manu-
facture.  Apple, however, on remand in the district court, could prove that the three articles 
substantially influenced a majority of consumers who purchased Samsung’s smartphone. 
112 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 10:50. 
113 Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 10:50. 
114 Christopher Versace, What Do Consumers Want in a New Smartphone, FORBES (Aug. 
21, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisversace/2013/08/21/what-do-consumers-want-
in-a-new-smartphone/#6fcb91c747b3. 
115 Id. 
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for its non-smart features.116  Thus, if the Supreme Court, in the fu-
ture, formulated an apportionment test, it would have great difficulty 
doing so because of the subjective nature of the value placed by pur-
chasing consumers on various aspects, both functional and ornamen-
tal, of the smartphone itself.117  Additionally, many consumers are 
not interested in solely the functional aspect, or solely the design as-
pect.118  Many consumers are interested in both aspects, which makes 
formulating a test for all courts to apply a tremendous challenge.119 
It seems natural for a court analyzing the issue to consider the 
motivation of the consumers who purchased the smartphones in ques-
tion; however, that factor should not be dispositive.120  Plaintiffs, 
when arguing that they suffered pecuniary losses as a result of a de-
fendant’s infringement, should be permitted to provide testimony or 
survey evidence that may show that consumers were, in part, moti-
vated to purchase the defendant’s product based on an infringing 
component.121 
The case, remanded to the District Court with the statute’s 
newly broadened definition, provides a heavier burden to plaintiff in 
establishing that consumers were motivated to purchase the defend-
ant’s products directly because of the infringed designs.122  While this 
will not serve to show per se infringement, it will likely play a sub-
stantial role in the determination of appropriate damages.123  If the 
main driver of sales of the defendant’s product is shown to be the 
 
116 James B. Stewart, How Jobs Put Passion Into Products, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/business/how-steve-jobs-infused-passion-into-a-
commodity.html?pagewanted=all. (“In most people's vocabularies, design means veneer. It's 
interior decorating . . . .  But to me, nothing could be further from the meaning of design. 
Design is the fundamental soul of a human-made creation that ends up expressing itself in 
successive outer layers of the product or service.”); also see Jessica Dolcourt, Why 
Smartphone Design Matters, CNET (May 5, 2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/why-
smartphone-design-matters-smartphones-unlocked/. 
117 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
118 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
120 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (“It does not necessarily follow 
that because no one factor is dispositive all factors are equally important, or indeed that all 
factors will have relevance in every case.  The factors should not merely be tallied but 
should be weighed according to their significance in the case.”). 
121 Electro-Mech. Corp. v. Power Distrib. Prods., 970 F. Supp. 2d 485, 492 (W.D. Va. 
2013) (“The plaintiff must prove that the customer's decision to buy the larger product in the 
first place is motivated by the presence of the patented component.”). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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component which infringed on plaintiff’s patent, then Apple may ar-
gue that, even under the new broad reading of Section 289, the entire 
amount of defendant’s profits should be awarded.124 
3. Language of Section 289 
In its brief to the Supreme Court, Samsung argued that Sec-
tion 289’s language regarding the infringer’s liability “to the extent of 
his total profit”125 “obviously cannot mean all of the company’s 
worldwide profit.”126  Samsung further argued that Congress, in for-
mulating and enacting Section 289, did not intend to radically alter 
the predecessor statute, which was enacted in 1887.127  At that time, 
Congress sought to protect design patents for items such as “carpets, 
wallpapers, and oil-cloths.”128  Samsung argued that in the legislative 
history, Congress did not intend design patents to apply to advanced 
technologies, which “embody hundreds of thousands of functional 
features having nothing to do with any patented design.”129  Although 
our legal system is built upon precedent, we must focus on the fact 
that Congress, in the year 1887, was likely not thinking about prod-
ucts that contained “hundreds of thousands of functional features.”130 
4. Analysis of Samsung’s Section 289 Argument 
The meaning of Section 289 is an important issue which re-
quires clarification by Congress or the Supreme Court.131  Since a de-
sign patent issued in the United States only applies to products sold in 
the United States, Congress or the Supreme Court could clarify that 
damages are limited to sales in the United States.132  If a court were to 
 
124 Id.  This outcome would be supported under the Supreme Court’s decision, as a final 
product is an acceptable interpretation of article of manufacture. 
125 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
126 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24. 
127 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25. 
128 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25. 
129 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 25 (“Congress never suggested that the same as-
sumptions would hold for complex products like smartphones, which . . . embody hundreds 
of thousands of functional features having nothing to do with any patented design.”). 
130 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13. 
131 The next best alternative would be for a district court or Federal Circuit to take this 
view in the Apple case. 
132 Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-
15
Rogowski: Design Patent Infringement
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
1258 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
hold that the infringer is liable, according to the statutory language, 
“to the extent of his total profit,” the court could certainly limit re-
covery without unduly burdening either party’s interest.133  For ex-
ample, a court could interpret “to the extent of [the infringer’s] total 
profit”134 to mean the extent of the infringer’s total profits derived 
from the sale of the product within the United States.135  This distinc-
tion could also serve as a deterrent to infringing manufacturers.136  If 
the manufacturer will lose all of its profits from each smartphone de-
vice sold within the United States, it is more likely to create a 
smartphone, which will not infringe at all on any patent.137  It is high-
ly unlikely for a phone manufacturer in another country to create a 
smartphone for which it will net zero profits in the United States.138 
Furthermore, Samsung’s allegation that the total profit would 
encompass “the company’s worldwide profit” of all products is a 
flawed argument.139  Under this argument, a court would be extreme-
ly unlikely to find that Samsung’s infringement of three design pa-
tents warrants Apple to receive all profits Samsung earned from its 
entire product line, including smart watches, televisions, headsets, 
and other products manufactured by Samsung.140  Samsung argues 
that non-infringing articles should not be included in the award.141  It 
is highly unlikely that a court, under a narrow reading of Section 289, 
would permit an award of damages derived from the sale of defend-
ant’s non-infringing articles.142  Thus, Samsung’s argument that “the 
 
intellectual-property-rights-ipr (last visited Apr. 11, 2017) (“The rights granted by a U.S. 
patent extend only throughout the territory of the United States and have no effect in a for-
eign country.”). 
133 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Congress intended to set statutory damages high in the intellectual property area for the 
purposes of deterrence (“Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter others 
from infringing intellectual property rights.  It is important that the cost 
of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compliance, so that persons who use or dis-
tribute intellectual property have a strong incentive to abide by the copyright laws.”  H.R. 
Rep. No. 106–216, at 6 (1999)). 
137 H.R. Rep. No. 106–216, at 6 (1999) (discussing the power of deterrence). 
138 Id. 
139 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 27. 
140 AstraZeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 782 F.3d 1324, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing a 
part of the District Court’s judgment because “the reasonable royalty reward included dam-
ages for the sale of non-infringing products.”). 
141 See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (providing that 
the only product at issue is a smartphone). 
142 See supra note 139. 
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text of Section 289 compels reversal” is faulty.143  Rather, the text, if 
anything, needs clarification and simple explanation by the Supreme 
Court, or a statutory amendment by Congress.144 
B. Arguments of the Appellee, Apple 
Named Time Magazine’s “Invention of the Year” in 2007, the 
iPhone was greatly praised not solely for its functional features but 
also critically for its appearance and design.145  In the cover page arti-
cle, discussing the first reason why Apple’s iPhone is “the best thing 
invented this year,” Time Magazine noted: 
Most high-tech companies don’t take design seriously.  
They treat it as an afterthought. Window-dressing.  
But one of Jobs’ basic insights about technology is 
that good design is actually as important as good tech-
nology.  All the cool features in the world won’t do 
you any good unless you can figure out how to use 
said features, and feel smart and attractive while doing 
it.146 
1. Design Fueled Sales 
Apple’s brief referred to reviews from various sources, which 
focused on the iPhone’s design, all to drive home the point that the 
design patents at issue fueled the sales.147  The New York Times de-
scribed the iPhone “as ‘gorgeous’ with a ‘shiny black [front face], 
rimmed by mirror finish stainless steel’ and a ‘spectacular’ user inter-
face.”148  Both of the design features complimented by The New York 
Times are protected by the patents infringed here, the D593,087 pa-
tent (shiny black front-face) and the D604,305 (colorful user inter-
face).149  Other design compliments came from the Wall Street Jour-
 
143 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 24. 
144 See discussion infra Sections X and XI. 
145 Lev Grossman, Invention of the Year: The iPhone, TIME MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1677329_1678542,00.html. 
146 Id. 
147 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5. 
148 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5.  See also David Pogue, Apple Waves Its 
Wand, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/10/technology/ 
10cnd-pogue.html. 
149 U.S. Patent D604,305 (issued Nov. 17, 2009); U.S. Patent D593,087 (issued May 26, 
2009). 
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nal,150 which along with The New York Times and Time Magazine, 
are not publications that generally focus their product reviews on de-
sign, and thus, their praise of the iPhone’s design speaks volumes 
about the partial motivation of customers who choose to purchase this 
product.151 
2. Substantial Similarity 
Samsung relied on the statement of one of its executives who 
said “[T]he difference [between the new Samsung phone and the iPh-
one] was truly that of Heaven and Earth.”152  However, Apple pro-
vided evidence of statements from Samsung’s executives that would 
lead a reasonable individual to believe that Samsung sought to create 
a product which closely resembled the iPhone.153  Samsung’s market 
share skyrocketed “from 5% to 20% in just two years” after creating 
smartphones, which directly competed with the iPhone.154  Wired 
Magazine published a story about the similarity of the new Samsung 
Vibrant and the Apple iPhone, which noted that the Vibrant’s design 
“was shockingly similar to the iPhone 3G: the rounded curves at the 
corners, the candy bar shape, the glossy, black finish and the chrome-
colored metallic border around the display.”155  The article went on to 
conclude, “[T]here’s little to make the [Vibrant] notable, apart from 
its striking similarity to the iPhone.”156  Further, acknowledging that 
Samsung is a “sophisticated company,” Apple argued that Samsung 
“chose to copy the design innovations of its biggest competitor and 
profited significantly from doing so.”157 
 
150 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 5. 
151 Arguably, Apple has led a revolution in the area of smartphone design.  This, perhaps, 
is the reason why many publications have continuously, from the iPhone’s inception, cov-
ered design aspects of new smartphone devices.  Since the introduction of the iPhone, most, 
if not all, new smartphones have in one way or another been inspired or influenced by Ap-
ple’s design of the iPhone.  A defendant will not be found liable for patent infringement 
solely on the basis of being inspired by another product.  The defendant must, as in Sam-
sung’s case here, actually violate and copy a design for which the plaintiff owns a registered 
and active patent. 
152 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9. 
153 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9 (“Let’s make something like the iPhone.”). 
154 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 10. 
155 Priya Ganapati, First Look: Samsung Vibrant Rips Off iPhone 3G Design, WIRED 
MAGAZINE (July 15, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/07/first-look-samsung-vibrant-
rips-off-iphone-3g-design/; see also Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 9, 11. 
156 See supra note 155. 
157 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3-4. 
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Since the jury found that “eighteen Samsung smartphone 
models infringed Apple’s design patents,”158 a logical conclusion can 
be drawn that “the design of eighteen separate Samsung smartphones 
was ‘substantially similar’ to the patented design of the iPhone.”159  
The substantial similarity, Apple argued, demands a narrow reading 
of Section 289 and the award equal to the total profits.160 
3. Language of Section 289 
Samsung, Apple argued, “introduced no evidence that the rel-
evant articles of manufacture were anything other than the whole 
smartphones and never offered any calculation of Section 289 dam-
ages based on anything other than their entire phones.”161  A narrow-
er reading of the statute would result in damages for infringement of 
one component of a multicomponent device to be equal to all profits 
derived from the sale of the device.162  This narrower interpretation 
would clearly work in Apple’s favor, as it would permit it to keep the 
$399 million in damages awarded by the lower courts rather than be 
entitled to only a small fraction, proportionate to the actual infringing 
components.163 
Since the Federal Circuit applied a narrow reading of Section 
289 of the Patent Act, Apple argued that the Supreme Court should 
affirm this narrow reading.164  The Supreme Court, however, reversed 
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and held the lower court could use 
a broader reading of Section 289.165 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
The Supreme Court’s holding did not clarify the main ques-
tion at hand.166  By simply holding that the article of manufacture 
definition applied by the Federal Circuit was too narrow, the Court 
 
158 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12. 
159 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12. 
160 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 12. 
161 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3. 
162 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13. 
163 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14. 
164 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14. 
165 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
166 Id. 
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failed to devise a rule to guide lower courts.167  The decision threat-
ens to cause confusion among lower courts and a split in cases at the 
Federal Circuit.168 
In a relatively brief and unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court reversed the narrow reading of Section 289 as applied by the 
Federal Circuit.169  The Court limited its holding to resolving the 
question: “[W]hether, in the case of a multi-component product, the 
relevant article of manufacture must always be the end product sold 
to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that prod-
uct?”170  By limiting itself to that very question, the Court constrained 
itself to resolving the issue in only one way.171  The Court held that 
“the term article of manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a 
product sold to a consumer as well as a component of that prod-
uct.”172  In some cases, the Supreme Court observed “a patent holder 
will sometimes be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a com-
ponent of the end product.”173  By rejecting the Federal Circuit’s nar-
row reading, which the Court stated “cannot be squared with the text 
of Section 289,” the Court reversed and remanded the case to the 
Federal Circuit to determine “whether, for each of the design patents 
at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or 
a particular smartphone component.”174 
On February 7, 2017 the Federal Circuit issued its per curiam 
decision to remand the case to the District Court, which is “better po-
sitioned to parse the record” of this litigation.175  On remand, the dis-
trict court would be able to determine whether a new trial on the issue 
of damages is necessary.176  If it orders a new trial, the district court 
“will have the opportunity to set forth a test for identifying the rele-
 
167 Id. 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21. 
169 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429. 
170 Id. at 434. 
171 As first-year law students learn, the use of the word “always” in a sentence is always 
fatal, as there are almost always exceptions. 
172 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 435.  This ruling is not entirely consistent with Samsung’s recom-
mendation that the Supreme Court hold that damages resulting from the infringement of one 
article in a multi-article product shall not result in damages equal to the total profits derived 
from the sale of the end product. 
173 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
174 Apple, 137 S. Ct. at 436. 
175 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 7, 2017). 
176 Id. 
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vant article of manufacture” under Section 289.177  To formulate a 
test, the district court most likely will consider various tests that prior 
courts have established, such as the apportionment approach, to avoid 
repeating failed tests.178 
VII. APPORTIONMENT AND ITS HISTORY 
The concept of apportionment resulted in many complex is-
sues of proof for design patent holders who were “required to show 
what portion of the infringer’s profit, or of his own lost profit, was 
due to the design and what portion was due to the article itself.”179  
The owner of the design patent “could recover only the proportionate 
amounts of profits that were proven to be attributable to the presented 
feature.”180 
Apportionment was a requirement until the case of Dobson v. 
Dornan (1886),181 which involved an infringement of a carpet de-
sign.182  The plaintiff was unable to present evidence on whether the 
purchasers of the defendant’s infringing carpets purchased the carpets 
based on the design, or whether the purchasers would have purchased 
the carpets without the infringing design.183  The Supreme Court 
awarded the design patent holder only six cents, a nominal sum, after 
the patent holder was unable to show what portion of the “infringer’s 
profits was due to the patented design and what portion was due to 
the unpatented [design].”184 
This decision, which Congress called a “virtual repeal” of de-
sign patent laws, led Congress to enact the Design Patent Act of 
1887.185  The House Committee on Patents, discussing this act, said 
the following: 
It is expedient that the infringer’s entire profit on the 
 
177 Id. 
178 Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10 (1886). 
179 Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
180 Id.  Under this test, Apple would have the burden of proof to show what portion of 
Samsung’s profits was attributable to the user interface and to the rectangular rounded-
corner shape design of the smartphone.  The burden was on Apple to prove “proportionate 
amounts of profits . . . attributable to the presented feature.” Id. 
181 Dobson, 118 U.S. at 10. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id; see also Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1886). 
185 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 17. 
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article should be recoverable, as otherwise none of his 
profit can be recovered, for it is not apportionable; and 
it is just that the entire profit on the article should be 
recoverable . . . , for it is the design that sells the arti-
cle, and so that makes it possible to realize any profit 
at all.186 
The Design Patent Act of 1887 applied “to any article of 
manufacture” and was, therefore, not limited to any specific compo-
nent of a device, but rather the finished product as a whole.187  The 
Second Circuit, in 1893, interpreted the provision in the following 
way: “The rule which [C]ongress declared for the computation of 
profits was the total profit from the manufacture or sale of the article 
to which the design was applied, as distinguished from the pre-
existing rule of the profit which could be proved to be attributable to 
the design.”188  Simply, the Second Circuit held that if a manufacturer 
of a product infringes on a patented design, the patent holder would 
be entitled to the entirety of defendant’s profits, rather than only prof-
its attributable to the patented design.189 
When Congress passed the Patent Act of 1952, the “total prof-
it” language used in the Design Patent Act of 1887 was incorporated 
into Section 289.190  As Apple argued in its brief, the issue of identi-
fying the relevant article of manufacture is up to the fact finder.191  
Based on case law dealing with Section 289, Apple asserted, the bur-
den of proof falls on the defendant to prove what the relevant article 
of manufacture is.192  A proper analysis of the issue of damages is vi-
tal, as the economy relies on innovation and new ideas without which 
economic progress would stall.193 
VIII. IMPORTANCE OF REWARDS FOR INNOVATION 
A marketable product does not suddenly appear overnight.194  
 
186 Congressional Record – House, p. 834. Speaker: Mr. Martin on H.R. 8323; see also 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
187 Congressional Record – House, p. 834. Speaker: Mr. Martin on H.R. 8323. 
188 Untermeyer v. Freund, 58 F. 205, 212 (2d Cir. 1893). 
189 Id. 
190 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
191 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3. 
192 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at 3. 
193 See infra text accompanying notes 194-217. 
194 Fred Vogelstein, The Day Google Had to ‘Start Over’ on Android, THE ATLANTIC 
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A product is born as a simple idea; countless hours are spent develop-
ing that intangible idea into a tangible marketable product, which 
ends up in the hands of consumers.195  Whether that product is a mas-
sive success or failure, it is up to the purchasing public to determine 
whether they will benefit from acquiring the given product.196  Natu-
rally, if the product is a failure, no other company or individual will 
want to reproduce the product and try to cash in.197  However, if the 
product is a success, any investor will try to enter the market and try 
to capitalize on its success.198 
Thus, a dilemma arises as to why any individual or company 
should invest a large amount of time and money when the easier al-
ternative is to just wait for somebody else to invest the time and 
money and then simply free-load on the idea.199  Patent law seeks to 
solve the dilemma by rewarding the innovator who made such an in-
vestment with a patent.200  The time and expense invested in the crea-
tion or invention of a new product is considerable, and a monopoly 
for the production and sale of that invention is considered a reward 
for the innovation.201  Legal protection is necessary because without 
it, competitors can simply free ride on an inventor’s idea without 
 
(Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/the-day-google-
had-to-start-over-on-android/282479/ (“By January 2007, they’d all worked sixty-to-eighty-
hour weeks for fifteen months—some for more than two years—writing and testing code, 
negotiating software licenses, and flying all over the world to find the right parts, suppliers, 
and manufacturers.”). 
195 Id. 
196 Product/Service Features and Benefits, KAUFFMAN|ENTREPRENEURS (Jan. 18, 2007), 
https://www.entrepreneurship.org/articles/2007/01/productservice-features-and-benefits. 
197 See supra note 194. 
198 Don Harris, Ten Reasons Chinese Companies Fail in the U.S., FORBES (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/07/21/ten-reasons-chinese-companies-fail-in-the-u-
s/#427857d59e19 (“the companies don't want to invest much on design, because it's bound 
to be copied by competitors right away.”); Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 
(7th Cir. 1997) (“Ty began selling the ‘Beanie Babies’ line . . . in 1993, and it was the popu-
larity of the line that induced [the defendant] to bring out its own line of bean-bag stuffed 
animals three years later.”). 
199 This is often a problem not only in the United States, but in China as well. Id. 
200 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (stating that “the franchise which the 
patent grants consists altogether in the right to exclude everyone from making, using, or 
vending the thing patented.”). 
201 The United States has long acknowledged the importance of the patent system in en-
couraging innovation.  Indeed, “the encouragement of investment-based risk is the funda-
mental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude.”  Important-
ly, the patent system provides incentive to the innovative drug companies to continue costly 
development efforts. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. D.C., 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
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making any investments.202  Along with that legal protection comes 
another huge benefit to an innovator: “[P]atents operate by temporari-
ly reducing competition.”203 
In today’s market-driven society, competition is enormous.204  
Profit maximization is the biggest driver behind many innovations.205  
The best way to achieve maximum profit is to create a unique product 
that is in high demand, but which no other company is producing.206  
Intellectual property law provides legal protections to innovators who 
create a product.207 
Thomas Jefferson said: “[S]ociety may give an exclusive right 
to the profits arising from [inventions], as an encouragement to men 
to pursue ideas which may produce utility.”208  Although Jefferson 
addressed an exclusive right in regard to utility patents, modern tech-
nology has focused a great deal on the design of new products and 
not only on their functional aspects.209  This “exclusive right to the 
profits” provides an enormous benefit to the innovator, and encour-
ages other entrepreneurs to create products.210  These products, like 
 
202 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working 
Paper (2d Series) 1, 3 (2000) (“Without legal protection, the creator of intellectual property 
may be unable to recoup his investment, because competitors can free ride on it.”). 
203 Vornado Air Circulation v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995). 
204 Tapping Our Talent, N.Y. St. B.J., October 2002, at 5. (“[T]oday’s fast-paced, infor-
mation-saturated society where the competition to be heard above the crowd is a daily chal-
lenge.”). 
205 Juan-Carlos Ortiz, International Trade Agreements and Private Desalination Plants: Is 
California’s Coast Safe? 30 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 676 (2009) (“[P]rivate companies are 
driven by profits and will cut down costs in order to maximize profits.”). 
206 Fred Vogelstein, supra note 194. 
207 Ray K. Harris & Rodney J. Fuller, Technology Barriers: 21st Century IP Basics, ARIZ. 
ATT'Y, January 2008, at 22 (“Intellectual property law is designed to encourage further dis-
covery and innovation by protecting and rewarding . . .  pioneering companies.”). 
208 VI. Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 180-81 (Washington ed.).  Although focusing on 
the word “utility” it is arguable here that the idea incorporates design patents as well.  
Thomas Jefferson (1743 – 1826) was not alive at the time the first design patent was issued 
in 1842.  Therefore, it is arguable that had design patents existed at the time of Thomas Jef-
ferson’s life, he would have included them in his writings, considering his views on the im-
portance of exclusive rights for inventors. 
209 This observation is especially relevant to a corporation such as Apple which has a long 
history, especially under the leadership of former-CEO Steve Jobs, of focusing much of its 
efforts on the design of each product it releases.  This focus on the beauty and aesthetic fea-
tures of its products led to the 2016 release of a book entitled “Designed by Apple in Cali-
fornia” (ISBN: 978-0-9975138-0-6 and 978-0-9975138-1-3) which is comprised solely of 
photographs of Apple’s devices over the history of the company.  Given this history, it can-
not reasonably be doubted that Apple places an enormous value on its design patents. 
210 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858). 
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the iPhone, bring enormous advantages to society as a whole.211 
The creation of the iPhone was not an overnight phenomenon: 
In 2004, Apple undertook a bet-the-company project 
to enter the smartphone market.  With no assurance of 
success, Apple spent billions of dollars as hundreds of 
its employees worked night[s], weekends, all the time 
to create a new, original, and beautiful object, some-
thing that would really wow the world.  Before launch, 
Apple’s risky venture was viewed skeptically.  But 
upon its release in 2007, the iPhone was acclaimed as 
a revolutionary product that set the standard for 
smartphone design.212 
As evidenced by Apple, a corporation spends a significant amount of 
time, energy, and resources on risky products.213  The risk is often as-
sociated with enormous rewards, which are only possible as a result 
of a monopoly on the new, groundbreaking product.214  Without pa-
tent protection, the payoff for risk taking would not be adequate, and 
society would suffer.215  This payoff should be safeguarded by laws, 
which provide deterrence to potential infringers, as well as guarantee-
ing financial rewards to inventors.216  To formulate a proper method 
or test for damages for infringement of multi-component devices, the 
District Court should first look at the calculation of damages in utility 
parent cases.217 
 
211 Id. (“It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted 
to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the 
public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and 
securing that monopoly.”). 
212 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14, at Introduction. 
213 Tim Bajarin, Why Apple is Spending Crazy Amounts of Money on New Ideas, TIME 
MAGAZINE (May 18, 2016), http://time.com/4339940/apple-rd-research-development/ (stat-
ing that Apple spent $10 billion on research and development in the first half of 2016). 
214 See supra note 2 (establishing that a patent will provide a monopoly, preventing any-
body from entering into direct competition). 
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (establishes that patents are a way “[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts”). 
216 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006); § 35 U.S.C. 284 (2006). 
217 However, the Supreme Court could review the same case.  When the District Court 
establishes a test for damages in multi-component devices, the case might be appealed to the 
Federal Circuit followed by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
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IX. APPROACHES TO DAMAGES IN UTILITY PATENT CASES 
In analyzing how the Supreme Court should rule in a design 
patent infringement case, it is helpful to observe how courts decide 
damages for other intellectual property infringement cases.218  Sec-
tion 284, which deals with utility patent damages, states the follow-
ing: 
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award 
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
fringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the 
court. 
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court 
shall assess them.  In either event the court may in-
crease the damages up to three times the amount found 
or assessed.  Increased damages under this paragraph 
shall not apply to provisional rights undersection 
154(d). 
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to 
the determination of damages or of what royalty 
would be reasonable under the circumstances.219 
The statute sets the floor and ceiling for damages in utility pa-
tent infringement cases.220  The minimum damages available under 
this statute are the “reasonable royalty for the use made of the inven-
tion by the infringer,” along with interest and costs.221  The maximum 
damages permitted are equivalent to three times the assessed 
amount.222  The key in this statute is the option of a compulsory li-
cense.223  Although compulsory licenses in patent law are very lim-
ited, and generally reserved for use by the federal government, there 
is no statute preventing the court’s use of a compulsory license in 
non-government infringement.224  The core function of Section 284 
 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 22-47. 
219 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
224 See infra note 274 and accompanying text on the limited use of compulsory patent li-
censing by the government in pharmaceuticals. 
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damages in utility patent cases is to ensure adequate and equitable 
damages.225  The statute lays out a road map for a court to apply to 
ensure proper damages are awarded.226  There is no reason why Sec-
tion 284 cannot be expanded to apply to Section 289.227 
The problem with compulsory damages is the difficulty in de-
termining an adequate amount as there is no bargaining process at the 
time of the infringement.228  Section 1498 deals with the govern-
ment’s patent licensing power.229  The statute requires the payment of 
“reasonable and entire compensation” for the term of use of the pa-
tent.230  However, courts may interpret the ambiguous wording to 
mean reasonable, as opposed to fair and true market value.231 Addi-
tionally, the granting of compulsory licenses violates the basis tenet 
of patent law, which provides that a patent holder has the exclusive 
right to sell, use, and manufacture the patented article.232  The District 
Court could apply some of these ideas to one of the proposed solu-
tions discussed in the next section. 
X. PROPOSED JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
The issue presented in the Apple litigation is likely to be re-
peated at some point in the near future.233  If Congress fails to amend 
Section 289, there are four ways in which the courts, in later deci-
sions, could clarify the issue.234 
 
 
225 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. (Use of the word ‘reasonable’ rather than ‘market value’ or ‘fair value.’). 
229 28 U.S.C.A. 1498 (2006). 
230 Id. 
231 Arguments can be made that when the government infringes on a patent and grants a 
compulsory license, the holder of the patent will have a new stream of revenue and thereby 
will benefit from the compulsory license. For a deeper analysis, see Amanda Mitchell, 
Tamiflu, the Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses: An Exploration of the Government's 
Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95 CAL. L. REV. 535, 542 (2007). 
232 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015). 
233 Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Samsung v. Apple, numerous design patent cases 
dealt with substantially the same issue in the Federal Circuit and came to different conclu-
sions.  See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Nike Inc. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
234 See discussion supra Sections X(A), X(B), X(C), and X(D).  Additionally, the District 
Court could adopt an approach in Apple. 
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A. The Bottom Line Approach–Federal Circuit’s Holding 
The first solution can be called “the bottom line approach.”  
The Supreme Court could take a very harsh stance against an infring-
er and award the plaintiff every penny of profit the defendant derived 
from the sale of each device that contained any design patent owned 
by the plaintiff.  This would involve a very simple and straightfor-
ward one-part test.  The only question that would be asked is: Does 
the product in question contain any component, regardless of how 
small, that violates an existing design patent?235  The plaintiff would 
have the burden to show the existence of a valid and active patent, 
and that the article in question either contains or uses the patented 
component.236  If the plaintiff meets its burden, then the infringer is 
liable for any profit it earned by selling the product to its custom-
ers.237  If the Supreme Court implements this test, any existing patent 
would be strengthened because a company or individual would think 
twice before manufacturing a product that comes very close to in-
fringing on an existing patent in fear that all profits would be lost.238 
This test would apply Apple’s narrow interpretation of Sec-
tion 289.239  Apple argued that a final product is simply one article of 
manufacture, not a composite of hundreds or thousands of individual 
articles of manufacture.240  Under Apple’s interpretation of article of 
manufacture, because three design patents were infringed and includ-
ed in Samsung’s final product, Samsung should be “liable to [Apple] 
to the extent of [Samsung’s] total profit.”241  However, Samsung ar-
gued, in both its brief to the Supreme Court and during the oral ar-
guments, that the final product can contain hundreds or thousands of 
articles of manufacture, and thus, the award of total profits would be 
inequitable.242 
In a case such as Apple, it is undeniable that both parties are 
 
235 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015) (establishing the patent holder’s right to exclude others 
from “making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the patented article). 
236 David Herr, et al., Declaratory Judgments-Patent Infringement-Burden of Proof, 29 (3) 
FED. LITIGATOR 5 (providing that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff patent holder, even in 
declaratory judgment actions). 
237 Id. (plaintiff carries the burden of proof). 
238 Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (holding that enhanced 
damages may be “justified where the infringer acted deliberately or willfully”). 
239 Brief for Respondent, supra note 14. 
240 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13; Brief for Respondent, supra note 14. 
241 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
242 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 44. 
28
Touro Law Review, Vol. 33 [2017], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/22
2017 DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT 1271 
large, international, sophisticated companies.243  Apple alone has over 
500 in-house attorneys.244  With the legal resources of each corpora-
tion so large, each is unquestionably aware of the patents owned by 
their competitors.245  Thus, if one of the two companies creates a 
product, a component of which infringes one or more patents of its 
direct competitor, it is not an oversight.246  Although it is possible 
that a company may believe that its product or feature is not infring-
ing the patent, it is likely to be aware of the existence of a substantial-
ly similar product or feature, which is patented.247  Considering that a 
company like Samsung is undisputedly a sophisticated manufacturer, 
it has the resources to safeguard itself against a potential infringement 
of another’s patents.248  An infringement of a direct competitor’s pa-
tent is no mistake, but is highly likely to be known.249  This 
knowledge supports the imposition of a heavy penalty on the infring-
er.  If the infringer’s bottom line is impacted, by penalizing the in-
fringer to the extent of his total profits and possible punitive damag-
es, there is a larger deterrence factor in the future.250 
This approach, applied by the Federal Circuit in Apple Inc., 
can have weighty and seemingly unfair ramifications.251  This ruling 
can be used as precedent to hold “an automobile manufacturer . . . li-
able for its entire profits from a particular car model if that model 
contained, say, an infringing tail light.”252  In the wake of Apple Inc., 
 
243 Samantha Sharf, The World’s Largest Tech Companies 2016, FORBES (May 26, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2016/05/26/the-worlds-largest-tech-companies-
2016-apple-bests-samsung-microsoft-and-alphabet/#2c87b69bb661 (discussing that Apple 
had $233 billion in revenue, $53 billion in profit, $239 billion in assets and a market value of 
$586 billion in 2016.  Samsung had $177 billion in revenue, $16.5 billion in profit, $206 bil-
lion in assets and a $216 billion market value). 
244 Peter Robinson, Here Are the Legal Generals Behind Apple’s Brawl With the FBI, 
BLOOMBERG TECHNOLOGY (March 4, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-04/apple-defense-pairs-cyberpioneer-
with-architect-of-samsung-brawl. 
245 The filing of a patent requires a thorough research of prior art.  That research reveals 
patents, which are similar in nature to the research. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 See supra note 243 for Samsung’s market value. 
249 Prior art searches are conducted by patent attorneys on a regular basis to check whether 
new concepts infringe on already existing patents. 
250 See Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
general concept of money damages as a deterrent to corporations). 
251 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
252 Not based on an actual case, this is an illustrative example of the potential ramifica-
tions of applying this test.  Jason Rantanen, Apple v. Samsung: Design Patents Win, 
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high damage claims are going to be much more credible.253  Uphold-
ing the Federal Circuit’s ruling will open floodgates to litigation.254  
A higher award in successful litigation is likely to motivate patent-
holders to file suit when they believe their patents are being in-
fringed.255 
A. Fairness and Equity Approach 
The second approach is a fairer and more reasonable option.  
Upon a finding of infringement of a design patent, the court would 
look at the final article of manufacture and evaluate the proportion of 
the total article, which infringes on the design patent.256  For exam-
ple, if the final article is made up of 100 smaller articles, each cov-
ered by its own patent, and three of those smaller articles are in-
fringed patents, the total damages will be closer to three percent of 
the total profits earned by the patent infringer.257  Under this ap-
proach, an exception would have to be made in situations where the 
infringed articles disproportionately contribute to the success of the 
product.258  If the exception were to apply, the plaintiff would have 
the burden to show the disproportionate effect of the article in ques-
tion on the end product.259 
A main idea behind capitalism is that an individual creates a 
product, invests his or her time and money in it and, assuming there 
is market demand for it, receives a return on investment.260  It would 
be contrary to our economic system for one company to profit from a 
product, or component of a product, which the company did not cre-
ate, manufacture, invest in, or take a risk in.261  Simply put, this ap-
proach would avoid unjust enrichment for the patent holder who 
could potentially see financial rewards for articles he did not cre-
 
PATENTLYO (May 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/samsung-design-
patents.html. 
253 Id. 
254 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
255 Considering the high expense of litigating patent cases, the award for successful litiga-
tion must be high enough to make the litigation worthwhile and profitable. 
256 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
258 See infra note 287. 
259 See supra note 236. 
260 See supra note 201. 
261 An important exception here is using articles, which are in the public domain. 
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ate.262 
In Apple, there is no question that Samsung infringed on three 
patents owned by Apple in the manufacture and sale of eighteen 
smartphones.263  The District Court, in analyzing the amount of dam-
ages Apple should be entitled to, would have to determine the propor-
tion of components in Samsung’s smartphone to the infringed com-
ponents to determine the value of the patents that Samsung 
infringed.264  Once the value is determined, Samsung would be liable 
to Apple only for the value of the patents actually infringed.265  This 
is a fairer and more equitable resolution because although three de-
sign patents were infringed, Samsung’s final product contained hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of components that were not copied.266  All of 
those components cost millions of dollars to develop and manufac-
ture, as well as countless time spent by hundreds of developers and 
manufacturers to create.267  If Apple was entitled to receive all profits 
for the smartphone containing the infringed patents, Apple would be 
receiving profits for which it neither developed nor invested time or 
money.268 
B. Compulsory License Approach 
A third approach would be a court-mandated retroactive li-
censing agreement.  A licensing agreement would force the infringer 
to pay a fair and reasonable fee to the infringed party, starting with 
the date of the first infringement.269  This approach is currently uti-
lized in lawsuits where the federal government or a government con-
 
262 Avoiding unjust enrichment is generally a contract law issue, governed by state law. § 
4:15. Unjust Enrichment-Limitations on Application, 28 N.Y. PRAC., CONTRACT LAW § 4:15.  
However, an unjust enrichment claim may be preempted by federal law. § 4:15. Id.  See Ul-
tra-Precision Manufacturing, LTD. v. Ford Motor Company, 411 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(providing an example of preemption of a state unjust enrichment claim by federal patent 
law). 
263 See generally Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec., 786 F.3d 983, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
264 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
266 Apple, 786 F.3d at 1001. 
267 Fred Vogelstein, supra note 194 (“By January 2007, they’d all worked sixty-to-eighty-
hour weeks for fifteen months—some for more than two years—writing and testing code, 
negotiating software licenses, and flying all over the world to find the right parts, suppliers, 
and manufacturers.”). 
268 Arguably, some of these damages could be considered punitive in nature. 
269 This approach is similar to that of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948). 
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tractor infringes on a patent.270  If a patent is “used or manufactured 
by or for the United States without license of the owner . . . the own-
er’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United 
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and 
entire compensation for such use and manufacture.”271  In such cir-
cumstances, the government is permitted to continue to use the patent 
subject to the compulsory license.272  However, the government will 
have to properly compensate the patent holder for the use of his in-
vention.273 
The compulsory license approach has also been recently used 
internationally in situations where the government needs to use a pa-
tented drug whose price is too steep.274  For example, in Thailand, be-
tween 2006 and 2007, two compulsory licenses were issued by the 
public health authorities “on AIDS drugs and one on clopidogrel bi-
sulfate (Plavix), a major cardiovascular treatment.”275  In the United 
States, a compulsory license threat was issued against pharmaceutical 
company Bayer as a result of the Anthrax scare.276  The United States 
intended to “stockpile . . . ciprofloxacin (Cipro) . . . as a defense 
against anthrax.”277  Before the government moved to do so, Bayer 
negotiated with the government and lowered the price of Cipro to 
avoid the compulsory license.278  However, the government’s use of a 
compulsory license for a lifesaving drug to benefit the general wel-
fare and health of its citizens is distinguishable from a potential com-
pulsory license on a design patent of an article that is used to manu-
facture a smartphone.279 
Under this approach, there would be little deterrence for com-
 
270 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948). 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions, 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE ETHICS (2009). 
275 Id. (also describing compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs in Rwanda (2007), Indonesia 
(2004 and 2008), Malaysia (2004), Brazil (2003 and 2007), Zambia (2004), Zimbabwe 
(2004), Mozambique (2004)). 
276 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions, 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE ETHICS 247, 249-50 (2009). 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Currently, in the United States compulsory licenses for patents are limited to govern-
ment use.  Technically, a license is not provided to the United States government for its use 
of a patented article, but rather the United States pays the patent holder compensation equiv-
alent to the lost profits or reasonable royalties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006). 
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panies and individuals to infringe patents.280  They would likely 
choose to infringe on the patents, and if the patent owner decided to 
engage in costly litigation, they could simply pay the patents’ fair 
market-value.281  Additionally, a company would engage in a cost-
benefit analysis, and if the cost of a compulsory license outweighed 
the cost to innovate and manufacture an alternate, non-patent infring-
ing, article, it would simply choose to infringe on the patent.282  Fur-
thermore, this approach would violate the basic goal of patent law, 
which is to create a monopoly for the patent-holder.283 
This licensing agreement would allow Samsung to retroac-
tively use the three design patents owned by Apple, but it would be 
forced to pay.284  The court would use available data and expert tes-
timony to determine the value of each of the three Apple design pa-
tents.285  Once a value is determined, Samsung would be forced to 
pay the fair value of the compulsory license.286 
C. The Customer Demand Approach 
A fourth approach focuses on customer demand.  The Su-
preme Court could grant certiorari for cases where only a small per-
centage of all components of the final product, rather than the entire 
product, infringes on existing patents; thus, it is important for the 
courts to consider the customer’s perspective.  Damages equivalent to 
the size of total profits under Section 289 should be available for the 
entire end-product “if the patented design is substantially the basis for 
customer demand for the entire article.”287 
A judicially created extension of damages for utility patents 
 
280 For a general discussion of damages as deterrents, see Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring 
the Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L. J. 347 (1998). 
281 This is a similar concept as in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (1948). 
282 Cost-Benefit Analysis, ENTREPRENEUR, 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/cost-benefit-analysis (last visited March 24, 
2017). 
283 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
284 Jon Matthews, Renewing Healthy Competition: Compulsory Licenses and Why Abuses 
of the TRIPS Article 31 Standards Are Most Damaging to the United States Healthcare In-
dustry, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. ISS. 1 (2010) (“Compulsory licenses are retroactive 
by nature.”). 
285 This is necessary in order to determine the proper value, as in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 
(1948). 
286 Id. 
287 Gary L. Griswold, 35 USC § 289 – An Important Feature of US Design Patent Law, 
IPO LAW JOURNAL (Apr. 6, 2015). 
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could be applied to design patents.288  This “entire market value rule” 
for utility patents is best explained by Cornell University v. Hewlett-
Packard Co.289 
(1) The infringing components must be the basis for 
customer demand for the entire machine including the 
parts beyond the claimed innovation, (2) the individual 
infringing and non-infringing components must be 
sold so that they constitute a functional unit or are 
parts of a complete machine or single assemble of 
parts, and (3) the individual infringing and non-
infringing components must be analogous to a single 
functioning unit.290 
Thus, if the customer purchases a product primarily for the compo-
nents, which were protected by the infringed patent, the patent-holder 
would be entitled to the entire market share, or the entire profit, of the 
given product.291  Furthermore, the infringing component must be a 
part of the completed end-product, rather than a separate article, and 
serve as a single functioning unit.292 
This approach would resolve the hypothetical presented in 
Subsection A, where an automobile manufacturer would be liable for 
the entire profits of a specific car model that infringed on a patent for 
a tail light.293  In that hypothetical, analyzed under this approach, the 
question would be whether the tail light in that specific car model 
was a substantial factor in the customer’s purchasing of the car mod-
el.294  If the answer was in the affirmative, then the patent holder 
would be able to recover the entire sum of the profits received by the 
automobile manufacturer for the sale of the product which contained 
the infringed patent.295  If, however, the answer was no, then the pa-
tent holder would only be entitled to a small portion, apportioned to 
 
288 Id. 
289 Patent holder brought a lawsuit against a competitor for infringement of an instruction-
issuing mechanism.  The jury ruled in favor of the patent holder. Cornell University v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286-87 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
290 Id. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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the significance of the tail light to the car model as a whole.296  The 
burden of proof would be on the plaintiff to prove that the customer 
demand for the product was substantially based on the infringing 
component.297  To satisfy the substantial standard, the court should 
apply the “but-for” test, by determining whether but for the infringing 
component the consumer would not have purchased this product.298 
This approach can be used to analyze the Apple case.  Sam-
sung argued in its brief, “[T]he undisputed evidence in the record 
shows that consumers purchased Samsung and other Android phones 
overwhelmingly because of their functional, non-design features.”299  
This argument directly fulfills factor one of the entire market value 
rule established in Cornell University.300  Further citing Apple’s mar-
ket data, Samsung argued that “a phone’s ‘design’ in general was a 
reason for only 1% of Apple purchases and 5% of Android purchases, 
far below other considerations such as services, multimedia func-
tions, ease of use, and brand.”301  If the District Court were to ap-
prove the facts presented by Samsung, as it should, considering Ap-
ple failed to rebut them, then under the “entire market value rule,” as 
explained in Cornell University, Samsung’s device would not meet 
the first requirement that “the infringing components must be the ba-
sis for customer demand for the entire machine including the parts 
beyond the claimed innovation.”302 
XI. PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTIONS 
Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 289 on July 19, 1952.303  As 
with any statute, Congress has the power to amend, repeal, or replace 
it.304  In order to provide clarity in future cases involving complex lit-
igation dealing with patent infringement in multicomponent products, 
 
296 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra note 236. 
298 See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
299 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 9. 
300 Cornell University, 609 F. Supp. 2d. 279. 
301 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 10. 
302 Cornell University, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 
303 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
304 That power even extends to constitutional amendments.  For example, Congress passed 
the 18th Amendment prohibiting the sale of alcohol on December 18, 1917.  In 1933, Con-
gress repealed it by passing the 21st Amendment. 
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Congress could clarify Section 289.305  Section 351 is the definitional 
section, which could be amended to add a narrower definition of the 
phrase article of manufacture.306  Alternatively, 35 U.S.C. § 289 
could be amended with language narrowing the definition of article 
of manufacture.307 
All federal laws are drafted and passed by the United States 
Congress;308 Section 289 is no different.309  The province of the 
courts is to interpret laws, not to write or amend the laws.310  The is-
sue exposed by Apple is one which requires the law to be amended, 
not interpreted.  As time progresses, so does technological innova-
tion.311  Patented articles become more complex, involve more com-
ponents, and the number of patents on each article increases as 
well.312 
Congress should seek to balance the interests of all parties.313  
The patent holder, under current federal legislation, possesses the ex-
clusive right to manufacture, sell, and use its patented article.314  That 
right, which is the keystone of patent law, must be kept strong.315  
Otherwise, the monopoly, which drives up financial benefits for the 
patent holder, will be diminished, leading to fewer rewards for the 
innovation, which in turn slows down the wheels of progress and in-
novation.316  Equally important, the public’s interest must be taken 
 
305 Congress could simply amend the definitional section of Title 35 to include article of 
manufacture. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States ….”). 
309 35 U.S.C. § 289 was passed by the United States Congress as part of the Patent Act of 
1952. 
310 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
311 Tom Warren, iPhone: A Visual History, THE VERGE (Sep. 9, 2014), 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/9/6125849/iphone-history-pictures (providing that every 
new release of a smartphone brings new features, new designs, each more complex). 
312 In 2015, Apple was awarded 1,938 patents; in 2016, Apple was awarded 2,102 patents.  
http://www.ificlaims.com/index.php?page=misc_top_50_2016. 
313 Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (providing 
an example of Congress’s balancing the interests for the statutory period of exclusivity). 
314 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2015). 
315 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858) (discussing the concept that the mo-
nopoly provided to the patent holder benefits both the inventor and the public or community 
at large). 
316 Martin I. Finston & David M. La Bruno, Recondite Harmonies of Interest-Where 
Standards and Patents Meet, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE (Oct. 2012) (“Innovation 
drives the U.S. economy, and the granting of patents is one of the ways the U.S. government 
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into consideration.317  Congress, by giving the patent holder a mo-
nopoly, has already determined that the public will be served well 
when one individual or corporation holds the exclusive right to manu-
facture.318  Rewarding the patent holder with the full value of lost 
profit will not have a negative impact on the public.319  Furthermore, 
any member of the public might be the next inventor who will de-
mand appropriate damages if his invention is infringed.320 
A congressional amendment would provide clarity for future 
similarly situated parties.321  There would no longer be a need for the 
Supreme Court, or any other court, to struggle with defining this key 
phrase, which would be determinative in deciding multi-million dol-
lar design patent infringement litigations.322  A body of legislators, 
elected by the People, is the appropriate venue for amending federal 
law, not a body of nine unelected individuals who are not representa-
tive of the Nation.323 
XII. CONCLUSION 
If there is a patent, which is infringed, the patent holder is en-
titled to damages from the infringer.324  That simple notion grows ex-
tremely complex when dealing with multicomponent products, such 
 
encourages and fosters innovation in this country.”). 
317 Kendall, 62 U.S. at 327-28.  (“It is undeniably true, that the limited and tempo-
rary monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or ad-
vantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the pri-
mary object in granting and securing that monopoly.”). 
318 Id. 
319 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006) (providing that the total amount of profits in case of infringe-
ment is appropriate, thus showing congressional thinking that the awards of total profits will 
not negatively impact society). 
320 The United States Patent and Trademark Office itself acknowledges that not all patent 
holders are wealthy corporations.  UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-
schedule#Patent%20Fees (last visited, March 21, 2017).  For those that file for a patent 
online, The PTO provides for three price scales--large entity, small entity, and micro entity. 
Id.  That acknowledgement clarifies that every day individuals might find themselves filing 
for a patent. Id. 
321 A clear statute would eliminate any argument between the parties as to what the law 
actually is. 
322 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2 (establishing a case and controversy requirement, which would 
be nonexistent if a clear and unambiguous statute existed on this issue). 
323 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in 
this court.”). 
324 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). 
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as smartphones.325  The appropriate amount of damages that the pa-
tent holder is entitled to is an open question.326 
In a heavily anticipated ruling, the Supreme Court took a very 
limited approach to the question regarding appropriate damages for 
design patent infringement under Section 289.327  Simply, the Su-
preme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s narrow interpretation of 
Section 289 was not correct.328  The Court held that “the term article 
of manufacture is broad enough to encompass both a product sold to 
a consumer as well as a component of that product.”329 
The Court’s unanimous decision declined to establish a test in 
cases dealing with Section 289 damages, and remanded the case to 
the Federal Circuit.330  Further, rather than narrow the definition to 
provide clarity to lower courts, the Court broadened the definition.331  
In turn, the Federal Circuit held that the district court is best able to 
handle the issues at hand, and expressly gave the district court the 
“opportunity to set forth a test for identifying the relevant article of 
manufacture” under Section 289.332  It is up to the District Court for 
the Northern District of California to be the leader in formulating the 
test, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in cases of design 
patent infringement in multicomponent devices.333 
Today, because of the Supreme Court’s ruling, we know what 
an article of manufacture is not.334  An article of manufacture is not 
always the finished end-product, nor is it always just a component of 
the finished end-product.335  Without a test established by the Su-
preme Court dealing with Section 289 damages, lower courts will 
continue to struggle with awarding appropriate damages.336 
 
325 See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. at 435. 
330 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429. 
331 Id. 
332 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 5:11-cv-01846-LHK, 2017 WL 490419 (Fed. 
Cir. Feb. 7, 2017). 
333 Id. 
334 Apple, 137 S. Ct. 429. 
335 Id. 
336 See generally Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337.  Notably, just three months after the Supreme 
Court ruling, the Federal Circuit ordered a new trial to determine appropriate damages in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apple.  Nordock, Inc. v. Systems, Inc., No. 2014-
1762, 2017 WL 1034379 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 2017). Acknowledging that the Supreme Court 
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Without congressional action, the District Court for the 
Northern District of California should adopt the customer demand 
approach.  If the plaintiff is able to carry the burden of proving to the 
fact finder that the sale of defendant’s product was fueled substantial-
ly by a component, which infringes on the plaintiff’s patent, the 
plaintiff should be entitled to the sum of the total profits of the de-
fendant.  The court should carry over the “entire market value rule” 
from utility patents as elaborated by Cornell University.337  Appor-
tionment in complex devices, such as a smartphone, would be a futile 
task for a jury.338  The need for clarity, simplicity, and deterrence 
makes the “entire market value rule” the ultimate test that the District 
Court should apply, and ultimately that the Supreme Court should 
adopt.  Until a specific test is adopted for this issue, there is guaran-
teed to be confusion, uncertainty, venue shopping, and a whole lot of 
lawyering.339 
 
 
in Apple held that the term article of manufacture is “broad enough to embrace both a prod-
uct sold to a consumer and a component of that product,” the Federal Circuit went on to say 
that the Supreme Court did not establish a test for the Circuit to follow. Id.  Here, one party 
argued that the entire dock leveler at issue is the proper relevant article of manufacture. Id.  
The other party argued that the relevant article of manufacture is a smaller component of the 
end-product (the “lip and hinge plate,” rather than the entire dock leveler). Id.  The Federal 
Circuit, not having a test to follow, remanded the case to the District Court to “revisit and 
restructure its jury instructions” for appropriate damages under Section 289. Id. 
337 See supra note 291 and accompanying text; Cornell University, 609 F. Supp 2d at 286-
87. 
338 i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (providing an 
example of a dispute regarding the amount of damages for the infringement of a patent for a 
“method and system for manipulating the architecture and the content of a document sepa-
rately from each other.” U.S. Patent 5,787,449 (issued July 28, 1998)). 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 1-21. 
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